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A RE-ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND
SOCIAL LANDSCAPE OF DESEGREGATION FROM

PLESSY V. FERGUSON TO PARENTS lNVOL VED IN
COMMUNITY SCHOOLS V. SEATTLE SCHOOL
DISTRICT No. 1
Stephen

rf.

Caldas, Ph.D.* and CarlL. Bankston III, Ph.D.**

ABSTRACT

This article re-examines the legal, political, and social
history of school desegregation from the Plessy u. Ferguson 1
decision of 1896 through the most recent 2007 Supreme Court
ruling in the Seattle and Louisville desegregation challenges. 2
We first consider the initial legal rationale and justification for
school desegregation that was presented to the Supreme Court
in 1954, and look at how rationale shaped its historic Brown I
decision.:l Following a critical look at the desegregation
experience from Brown I and Brown 114 to the turn of the
twenty-first century, we consider how the Connecticut Supreme
Court case of Sheff u. O'NeiZZC' set the stage for radical change
m the direction of future desegregation litigation. We also
· Profpssor. D<·partnwnt of Foundations, IPadership and l'olicy Studi,•s. Hofst rn
Uniwrsity.
"Professor, Department of Soeiolof(y, Tulane Univ<>rsity.
1. PIPss:-• v. Ferguson. Hi:l U.S. fi:l7. fi51 (1 H!.Jfi) (holding that facilities for blacks
and whites could bP "separate but Pqual" and that the Fom·tt·Pnth Anll'ndnwnt
was not intended to secure social equality).
2. Pan•nts lnvolwd in Cmty. Sch. v. SeattlP Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 27:3H.
276H (2007)

:i. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brou•n [), 847 U.S. 4H:l. •194 (19fi4) (rejPcting thP
"steparate but <'qual" proposition).
4. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (/3rotL'I1 II). :)49 U.S. 294. :101 (19fi:)) (ordering southem
school distt·icts to impiPment flmum I with "all delib,~rate speed").
fi. Slwf'f' v. O'N.,ill, fi7H J\.2d l2fi7. 12Hfi (Conn. 1996) (holding that the
legislature must take responsibility to n•medy dt• jure and de facto segn•galion i:1
public schools).
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consider the potential impact on school desegregation of the
2003 Grutter u. Bollinger 6 and Gratz u. Bollinger 7 Supreme
Court decisions involving affirmative action in admissions at
the University of Michigan. Finally we weigh the potentially
huge impact of the 2007 decision overturning the Seattle and
Louisville desegregation plans that used race of students in
making school assignment decisions. 8
I. INTRODUCTION

In this article we take a fresh look at the legal, political,
and social history of school desegregation beginning with its
antecedents in the Plessy u. Ferguson 9 decision of 1896, which
legalized racial discrimination through its "separate but equal"
holding. We re-visit the legal rationale and justification for
school desegregation that was presented to the Supreme Court
in 1954, and consider how these arguments shaped its historic
Brown I decision. 10 We carefully re-examine the half-century of
struggle to desegregate America's schools in relation to the
larger social and political context within which the
desegregation drama was being played out. Our analysis
concludes with the most recent 2007 Supreme Court
desegregation decisions, which struck down the Seattle,
Washington and Louisville, Kentucky desegregation plans that
considered the race of students in assignment to schools. 11
Overall, we conclude that coercive desegregation orders in
general have not worked, that major Supreme Court
desegregation decisions have often been significantly
influenced by the social and political milieu of the times, and
that top-down efforts to desegregate schools have often
exacerbated rather than remedied the racial segregation of
schools. Many policy makers fail to understand that schools are
the products of the social contexts in which they are situated,
and are not easily manipulated as instruments to socially
reconstruct society. As for efforts to redistribute students on

fi. Grutter v. Bolling-er, 539 U.S. :=HJn. :143-44 (2003).
7. Gratz v. Bolling-er, 5:19 U.S. 244, 276 (2003).
H. Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2768.
9. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 5:37, fi52 (1896).
10. Brown v. 13d. of Educ .. 347 U.S. 4~-l:1, 494 (1954).
ll. Parents. 127 S. Ct. at 2768.
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socioeconomic grounds, the history of the socioeconomic
balancing of schools is not sufficiently extensive to conclude on
empirical grounds that the redistribution of students on
socioeconomic grounds rather than racial grounds will not
work. However, the logic of our examination suggests that topdown efforts aimed at socioeconomic balancing to desegregate
schools will be no more successful than desegregation efforts
aimed directly at race have been.
In Section II, we begin our discussion with the "separate
but equal" doctrine of Plessy to its legal demise in Brown I.
Then, we create a typology of sorts, and classify the subsequent
history of desegregation into six distinct periods, describing key
legal, political, and social developments within each timeframe. These periods are:
1) the time span from Brown I (and subsequently Brown II)
to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 when many southern school
systems resisted school desegregation (Section III); 13
2) the "freedom of choice" period immediately following the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 14 when school systems were prodded
to begin the process of desegregating schools or face the
consequence oflosing federal funding (Section IV); 15
3) the period of more "affirmative" federal involvement in
school desegregation beginning with the 1968 Green decision
(Section V); 16
4) the period of decreasing federal activism in desegregation
starting in the mid -1970s and extending through the 1980s
(Section VI); 17
5) the unitary (i.e., ostensibly "integrated") status era of the
late 1980s into the early 2000s, characterized by minimal
governmental involvement in school racial composition. During
this period the Court facilitated the attainment of unitary

12. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L. 88-:352, 78 Stat. 241 (19()4).
13. STEPHEN.]. CALDAS & CARLL. BANKSTON, FORCED TO FAIL: THE PARADOX OF
SCHOOL DESEGHE(;i\TION 28 -29 (2007) [hereinafter FOHCED TO F,\ILJ.
14. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L. 88-:352, 7R Stat. 241 (1964).
15. GAHY 0RFIELIJ. THE RECONSTHUCTION OF SOUTHEI{N EDUCATION: THE
SCHOOLS AND THE 19fi4 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 341 (1969).
16. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 4:10, 441-12 (1961') !holding that the
"freedom of choice plan" failed to satisfy the school board's nesponsibility to end
segregation in schools).
17. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken[). 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (ruling out crossdistrict desegregation remPdi,,s, such as cross-district busing, to further integrate
districts charged with de jure violations).
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status of desegregating school districts by allowing them to
redress past de jure violations "to the extent practicable" 18
(Section VII) and finally;
6) the current and expected trends in school desegregation
in the light of significant judicial action by the Connecticut
Supreme Court in Sheff, 19 the Supreme Court's 2003 rulings on
affirmative action in Grutter 20 and Gratz 21 , and its 2007
desegregation rulings in the Seattle I Louisville 22 decisions
(Section X).

II. PRE-BROWN SEGREGATION: THE "SEPARATE BUT EQUAL"
DOCTRINE

A. Institutionalization of the Doctrine

By the time of the Plessy v. Ferguson 23 "separate but
equal" 24 decision of 1896, the white-dominated governments in
the South had already largely undone any progress made
toward integrating freed blacks into southern society during
Reconstruction. 25 In the time after Plessy v. P'erguson and
before Brown I, American history had an uncanny resemblance
to the legal Apartheid of South Mrica. 26 Jim Crow legislation
in states and localities across the South both disenfranchised
blacks politically and slowly separated blacks from whites in
many
social
spheres
including
restaurants,
public
transportation, and housing. 27 Armed with majority political
control, white power-elites who dominated local and state
governmental institutions ensured that blacks were politically

18. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 4\18 U.S. 2::l7, 241 (1991).
19. Sheff v. O'Neill, G78 A.2d 12G7. 127G (Conn. 1996).
20. Grutter v. Bollinger, G:39 U.S. 982, :i43-44 (200:3).
21. Gratz v. Bollinger, G:39 U.S. 244, 276 (200:)).
22. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1. 127 S. Ct. 27:18,
2768 (2007).
2:1. Plessy v. Ferguson. 16:1 U.S. 5::l7, 5Fi0--51 (189G).
24. The phrase ''separate but equal" actually comes from ,Justice Harlan's
dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 1o:l U.S. at Fi52 n.2H (Harlan .•J., disst>nting).
25. RIC'HAIW WOill\lSER, THE RISE AND FALL OF ,JIM CROW 2H-41 (2004).
26. Tn 1948, South Africa passed legislation banning mixed-race marriages: the
Group Areas Act of 19Fi0 separated blacks and whites and the Separate Amenities Act
of 195:3 permitted separate buses, hospitals, schools. and universities.
27. DOUCLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMEI{ICAN AI'AI\TIIEIIJ: SECilE<;ATION
A:-.Jll THE MAKIN(; OF TilE UNIJERCLASS 26 (1 ~198).
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barred from challenging the "separate but equal" doctrine. 28
With the removal of northern troops in 1877 and the end of
"Radical Republican" 29 efforts to reconstruct the South, black
rights were gradually stripped away and blacks were
increasingly relegated to their own institutions and social
spheres, separate from whites. Thus, in Plessy v. Ferguson, 30
the Supreme Court in a sense simply validated and rendered
constitutional the social reality already prevalent throughout
most of the South: blacks were indeed "separate."al However,
allowing states and localities to ignore de facto (actual)
segregation problems and adopt de jure (legal) segregation
policies opened a Pandora's Box that would take fifty years to
legally shut. It was not long after the Plessy ruling that legal
segregation was extended to schooling. In 1899, the Supreme
Court upheld a Georgia school board's action to close a black
high school and build two black elementary schools in its
place. 32 The only option available for the displaced black high
school students was parochial education.:i:i In a legal rationale
that echoed the states' rights philosophy prior to the Civil War,
the Supreme Court did not interfere in the board's decision to
prohibit black students from attending the white high school,
ruling that the entire issue was a state, not a federal, matter. 34
Nine years later, in the case of Berea College u. Kentucky, 35 the
Supreme Court upheld a Kentucky law that prohibited
educational institutions of higher learning from teaching

28. Id. at 154-G5.
29. See r.;enerally HANS LOUIS TREFOUSSE, THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS: LINCOLN'S
VANGUARD FOR RACIAL .JUSTICE (1()75).
30. Plessy v. Ferguson, 1G3 U.S. 537,551-52 (189G).

31. Stephen .J. Caldas, The Plessy and Grutter Decisions: A Study in Contrast
and Comparison, G7 OHIO ST. L .•J. GG, G9 (200G) [hereinafter The l'lessy and Grut.t.er
Decisions].
:12. Cumming v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond County, 17fi U.S. fi28, fi4fi (18BB).
:33. ld. "[P]arochial education refers to the schooling obtained in elementary and
secondary schools that are maintained by Roman Catholic pa1·ishes, Protestant
churches or .Jewish organizations; that are separate from thl' public system and that
provide education based on sectarian principles." Britannica Online Encyclopedia,
Parochial
Education.
h ttp:l/www. britannica.com/pb/a rtidl'- 905854 //parochialeducation (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
34. Cumming. 17G U.S. at 545 (stating that "any interferenc(' on the part of
Federal authority with tlw managPment of such schools cannot lw justified except in
the case of a ch,ar and unmistakable disregard of rights sPcured by the supreme law of
the land").
35. Berea Coli. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908).
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blacks and whites if classrooms for each race were less than
twenty-five miles apart.:36 Thus, in the Berea College ruling the
Supreme Court significantly extended the Plessy "separate but
equal" doctrine to include institutions of higher education. 37
Still, blacks did maintain their own healthy social and political
institutions, most notably the black church:38 and black
communities, though separate, remained strong. In 1909, the
NAACP was founded by a committee, which included W.E.B.
DuBois, to protect blacks from lynching and to defend and
extend civil rights to blacks. 39

B. 1930s-1954: Diminishing the Doctrine of
"Separate but Equal"
It was during the 1930s that the first significant legal
fissure in the "separate but equal" doctrine appeared. In State
of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, the NAACP mounted a
Fourteenth Amendment challenge against a Missouri State
Supreme Court ruling that upheld the University of Missouri's
law school policy of not admitting blacks. 40 At this time there
were law schools for blacks within the state (in other words,
there was no "equal" black institution). 41 The Supreme Court
overturned the state ruling, arguing that blacks had to be
admitted to the all white law school since no "separate"
facilities were available for blacks. 42
World War II marked growing sensitivity among blacks
about their inherently unequal status at home as they fought
foreign oppression in the European and Pacific theatres only to
return to a country where racial discrimination was still
practiced on a broad scale. 43 Following the war, black leaders
like Walter White of the NAACP and labor organizer A. Philip
Randolph publicly demanded an end to the practice of
segregated military units. 44 President Truman ultimately

36. Id. at 60.
37. See id.
38.

ERIC' C. LI0!COLN

&

LAWREl\iCE

H.

MAMIYA, THE BLACK CHURCH IN THE

AFHICA0! AMEHIC\N EXI'EBIENCE 8 (1990).
39. MINNIE FINCH. THE NAACP: ITS FIGHT FOR JUSTll'E 4 (1981).

40. lVIissouri ex rcl. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, :342 (193i-\).
41. State ex rel. Gain!!s v. Canada, 113 S.W.2d 783, 784--SG (Mo. 1937).
42. Missouri, :305 U.S. at :352.
43. NORMAN COOMBS, TilE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN AMEIUC/\ 181-82 (2004).
44. /d. at lSIJ.
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granted their petition in 1948 when he signed Executive Order
9981, mandating the racial integration of America's armed
forces. 45 In 1950, the American military began racially
integrating fighting units at the outset of the Korean War. 46
In that same year, the Supreme Court's decision in Sweatt
u. Painter dealt an unprecedented legal setback to the
"separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy u. Ferguson, 4 7 when the
Court recognized that separate schools were not necessarily
equal. 48 In Sweatt, a black man sued for admission to the
University of Texas law school, since there was no Texas law
school for blacks. 19 The state of Texas set up a separate law
school for blacks and the Texas state courts held that this new
law school was "substantially equivalent." 50 Sweatt pressed his
case for admission to the all-white University of Texas law
school, which prompted the Supreme Court to rule that the
new black law school was hardly "equal" to the white law
school. 51 The case set a precedent acknowledging that
"separate" educational facilities for blacks were not necessarily
equal. 52 The reality was that they were almost never equal. 53

III. BEGINNING THE ERA OF DESEGREGATION:
THE BROWN DECISIONS

The NAACP hoped that with Sweatt, Southern school
districts would move to upgrade and equalize black educational
facilities. When they didn't, the NAACP launched a frontal
assault on the "separate" part of the "separate but equal"
doctrine. 54 The Brown u. Topeka Board of Education 55 (Brown
I) decision of 1954 marked the opening shot in the modern
school desegregation era, and presaged the Civil Rights
Movement. In the case, plaintiff Linda Brown sought

45.
46.
47.
4H.
49.
50.
51.
52.
5:1.
54.
55.

Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4:na (.Jul. 26, 194H).
COOMBS, supra note 43, at 185--HG.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 16:l U.S. 5:17, 552 (1896).
Sweatt v. Painter, :J:19 U.S. 629, G:l4-:15 (1950).
!d. at 631.
lei. at 632 (internal quotation marks omitted).
!d. at 6:14-35
!d.
COOMBS, supra notP 4:1, at 190.
!d.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown!), :'l4 7 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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admittance to an all-white school. 56 The Supreme Court
concluded that "[i]n the field of public education the doctrine of
'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal." 57 The Brown decision
declared, in effect, that virtually every public school system in
the South was in violation of the law due to their de jure-i.e.,
legally enforced-racially separate educational systems. 58
A. The Reasoning Behind Brown

Brown I was elegant in its minimalist simplicity. The
decision resulted in a school district plan where "school
children irrespective of race or color shall be required to attend
the school in the district in which they reside and that color or
race is no element of exceptional circumstances warranting a
deviation of this basic principle." 59 The plan endorsed both the
concept of the colorblindness of Justice Harlan's dissenting
opinion in Plessy, 60 as well as the concept of every child in a
given district attending the same school, which could be
construed as an endorsement of neighborhood schools. 61 The
gist of the Brown ruling was that blacks who lived in the same
geographical locality as whites could not legally be prohibited
from attending the local school with whites solely on account of
their race. 62 This simple colorblind concept was not accepted
throughout much of the segregated South, and prompted
governors like Jimmy Davis of Louisiana to consider closing
down the public schools rather than allow white and black
children to be educated together. 63
When it became clear that simply ordering schools to abide
by the Supreme Court's ruling was not enough to change

56.

ld. at 486.

57. !d. at 4%.
58. See id.
59. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 1:39 F. Supp. 468, 4G9 (19fifi).
60. In his famous dissl'nt from the majority decision in /'lessy u. Fer!{uson, Justicte
Harlan stated. "Our constitution is color-blind, and nPithPr knows nor tolt>rates classPs
among citizens. In J'esJwct of civil rights, all citizens are .equal hefon• tlw law." Plessy v.
Ferguson, Hi::l U.S. fi:l7. fiG9 (1H9ti) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
61. Christim• .J. Rossell. The C:ont'Prf{cncc of Blach and White Attitudes on School
Desc!{l'c!{ation Issu.cs /Jurin!{ the Frmr Decade Evolution of the Plans, :Hi(2) WM. & MARY
L. REV. 613. 61 :)--11 ( 1~J9fi) jhl'i't•inafter Conucr!{encc of Blacl! und White Attitudes].
62. Sec Brown I. :117 U.S. at 49:l-94.
63. LIVA 13AKI.:R, '!'Ill<: SJ•:CONIJ BATTLE OF NEW ()}{LEANS: '!'JJJo: HUNDRED YEAJ{
STIWGGLJo: To lNTJo:<:J(A'J'J•: 'I'll J•: SCJJOOLS ;)28 (1996).
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decades of segregation-like educational practices, the Supreme
Court issued a second ruling in 1955, sometimes referred to as
Brown II. 64 This second ruling ordered districts to desegregate
with "all deliberate speed," and charged federal district courts
with
crafting
appropriate
remedies
and
overseeing
implementation of the Supreme Court's ruling, marking the
beginning of federal judicial involvement m
school
desegregation. G5

B. Federal Involvement and Desegregation Orders
As Southern intransigence toward desegregation continued
and even deepened, 66 the federal government intervened. In
1957, President Eisenhower took the unprecedented action of
ordering National Guard troops to escort nine black children
into a formerly all white high school in Little Rock, Arkansas,
when Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus defied the court order
to desegregate. 67 This audacious federal intervention seemed to
simply embolden southern segregationist leaders, some of
whom used Little Rock as a rallying cry in their election
campaigns.68 For example, in his 1958 campaign for governor
of Mississippi, staunch segregationist candidate Ross Barnett
stated, "I would rather lose my life than see Mississippi schools
integrated." 69 The Virginia Assembly passed legislation
authorizing the closing of any school that allowed blacks and
whites to attend together. 70 Then, in 1959, the Prince Edward
County school board in Virginia did just that: it shut down the
entire school system for five years rather than allow black
children to sit next to white children in the same classroom. 71
Not all Southern white leadership during this era was
militantly segregationist (though most Deep South governors

---~~-

---

-~~-

-~----~

fi4. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), :349 U.S. 294, :101 (1955).
fiG. Id.
fi(i. Earl Black, Southern Governors and Political Change: Campaign Stances on
Racial Segregation and Economic Development, 1950-69, THE ,J. OF POL. 707 (1971).
67. David L. Kirp, Retreat into Legalism: The Little Rock Sehoul Desegref{ation
Case in Historic Perspective, :10 Tm; ,J. OF POL. Scr. & POL. 443, 44:l-4 7 (Hl97).
fiH. Black, supra note fiG, at 715.
(i9. Id. at 710.
70. VA. CODE ANN.§ 22-188.:! et seq. (1958), invalidated by Harrison v. Day, 10fi
S.E.2d fi3G, fi4fi-47 (Va. 1959).
71. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218,221 (1964).
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were), 72 with leaders ranging from the segregation or die
philosophy of the aforementioned Governor Barnett of
Mississippi, to Governor John Connolly of Texas, who southern
political expert Earl Black classified as a non-segregationist. 73
Some limited school desegregation in the South began taking
place in the early sixties without the need for federal
government involvement. For example, New Orleans drew
national attention when it finally allowed blacks to attend
formerly all-white schools in 1961 (in spite of Governor Davis'
segregationist bluster, and white parents who called
themselves "the cheerleaders" harassing black children
enrolling for the first time in all white schools). 74 Evidence of
the coming tidal wave of changes in race relations was
presaged by Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech at
the Lincoln Memorial in 1963, 75 which attracted a quartermillion whites and blacks who sought for more full inclusion of
African-Americans in mainstream American society.
Although in some cases federal intervention was not
necessary, the widespread need for federal involvement led to
anti-discrimination legislation that extended to every public
school. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided advocates with an
effective tool to hasten the desegregation of schools against
Southern states which continued to be intransigent. With the
passage of this act, much began to change. The Civil Rights Act
allowed the federal government to withhold federal funding
from schools that discriminated on the basis of race, religion, or
national origins (emphasis added). With the passage of the
Elementary and Secondary Education (ESEA) Act of 1965, 76
which included billions of dollars in new federal programs such
as Head Start, the Free and Reduced Price Lunch Program,
and Title I compensatory educational funds, the feds now had a
very big carrot ... and an equally big stick. 77 School districts

72. Black, su.pra note 66, at 713.
7:l. ld. at 712.
74. BAKER, supra note 6:~. at 41:3-15.
7f>. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream Speech, Address at the March (Aug.
28, 196:J). in WE HAVE A DREAM: AFRICAN-AMERICAN VISIONS OF FREEDOM 167 (Uiana
Wells eel., 1993).
76. Elementary and Secondary Education (ESEA) Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. H9- 10,
79 8tat. 77 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 240 (2000)).
77. We discuss in much more depth how federal government involvemPnt in
schools has been steadily increasing in all areas of education since the Brown dt>cision
in our article, Stephen J. Caldas & Carl L. Bankston, The Evolution of Federal
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that complied with the law had access to additional funds to
help desegregate their schools, but those who did not
desegregate risked losing all federal funding.78

C. Social Acceptance of Brown and Desegregation
The job of breaking down white southern resistance to
school desegregation was made ever easier by the changing
tides of societal and political attitudes towards civil rights for
blacks. Scenes of peaceful civil rights protesters contrasted
sharply with images of southern white policemen brutally
enforcing segregationist policies against nonviolent white and
black resisters. In the early and mid-1960s it was clear to an
increasing number of Americans which group had the morally
superior position. Memories of burly cops bludgeoning helpless
black protesters for merely sitting at the "wrong" restaurant
counter were seared deeply into the American collective
consciousness. There is empirical evidence that resistance to
racial segregation was breaking down throughout the South in
the early to mid-1960s. For example, during the period 1962-65
half as many militant segregationist governors were elected in
the South as in the previous four year period, compared to a
four-fold increase in the number of non-segregationist
governors. 79 The way was being prepared for more federal
legislation and Supreme Court edicts that would further the
desegregation of schools.
In 1964, the Supreme Court ruled against the Prince
Edward County school board, ordering the district to reopen
schools closed since 1959. 80 The Griffin ruling outlawed state
action authorizing the closing of schools to avoid desegregation,
as well as forbidding districts from publically funding private
schools for whites-only.81

Involvement in Local Schools, 42 SOCIETY 49-53 (May/June 2005) [hereinafter The
Evolution of Federal Involvement].
78. Michael B. Wise, School Desegregation: The Court, the Congress, and the
President, THE SCH. REV. 159, 160 (Feb. 1974); GARY 0RFIELD, supra note 15, at 319.
79. Black, supra note 66, at 716.
80. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964).
81. See id.
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IV. THE FREEDOM OF CHOICE ERA AND REMEDYING
DE JURE SEGREGATION

Within several years after passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, most de jure (legally enforced) school segregation came to
an end as southern school systems lifted their legal bans on
blacks and whites attending school together. The 1960s has
been referred to as the "freedom of choice" era in American
educational history, since schools remedied de jure segregation
by giving students the "choice" about whether or not to attend a
school with children from another race. 82 There is evidence to
suggest that during the "freedom of choice" period, most
southern school systems effectively complied with the 1954
Brown decision by dismantling their dual de jure segregated
systems based on race. 83 In other words, most southern blacks
were no longer barred from attending schools in their district
solely on account of their race.
However, freedom of choice did not remedy the long
standing effects of de facto segregation (segregation caused by
reasons other than legal fiat) in every school. In reality, there
was intense social pressure among whites, and to some extent
even among blacks, to attend schools populated by students
from their own race, which prevented the freedom of choice
remedy from causing significant racial integration in schools
that were formerly segregated by law. K4 Also, blacks and
whites simply tended to live (and still tend to live) in different
areas, so attending a school in one's neighborhood district often
meant (and often still means) attending a majority one-race
school. 85 This de facto segregation of the races is still
widespread in many parts of the U.S. 86 In the context of the
social activist climate of the late 1960s, and in light of the very
influential 1966 study, "The Coleman Report," which suggested
that racially integrated schools should help blacks
82. JEFFHEY A. RAFFEL. HISTOIUCAL DICTIO:-.JAHY OF SCHOOL SECHE<:ATIO:\ .\:\IJ
DESEm<EUATION 108-0!:J (19!:JH).

S:l. CHRISTINE H. ROSSELL. The Evolution of School Desef?rc,~.;ation Plans Since
1954, in THE END OF DESEGI<EGATION'~ 52 (Stephen J. Caldas & Carl L. Bankston III
eds., 2003) [hereinafter Evolution of School Desegre,~.;ationj; Conuer,~.;ence of Blacli and
White AttitudPs, supra note 61, at 61:1-63.

84. Convcrf?ence ol Black and White Attitudes, supra note 61, at 615.
85. DOUGLAS MASSEY AND NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: S~<:l;RE<:NI'!0:-.1
\ND THE MAKI:-.JG OF THE UNDEHC'LASS 83 (1998).

86. Id. at 8:3-114.
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academically, H7 the Supreme Court handed down Green v.
County School Board of New Kent County 813 in 1968. This
decision would have consequences for schools and communities
almost as profound as Brown, and the current discourse around
schools and race "probably owe their intellectual origins to
Green not Brown .... "H~J As noted by desegregation expert
Christine Rossell, it was Green that "decided that eliminating
de jure racial discrimination was not enough to establish a
unitary system," 90 and that creating racially mixed schools
would be required by school systems even after they had ended
the racial discrimination practiced under their former dualsystems.91

V. GREEN: AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO DESEGREGATE
In Green, the Supreme Court ruled that the New Kent
County, Virginia school board's "freedom of choice"
desegregation plan was neither working nor constitutional. 92
That it was not working, at least as a meaningful
desegregation device, was beyond question. As the Court noted,
"[i]n three years of operation not a single white child has
chosen to attend Watkins school ... and 85'% of the Negro
children in the school system still attend the all-Negro Watkins
school. In other words, the school system remains a dual
system." 9 :l Neither was the New Kent County school system
unique. In systems across the South, and to some extent in the
North as well, most whites and blacks attended schools where
their race represented 90'% or more of the student body prior to
the Green Decision. 9 4
Beyond finding the freedom of choice remedy to de jure
segregation inadequate, the Court found that there was an
even greater responsibility on schools to desegregate by making

H7. ,],'-'\!!<:~ S. COLEI\L\1'\, EqUALITY OF EIHH'·\TION \L 0I'I'ORTt:"iiTY 22 (U.S.
Department of Health. Education, and Welfare Hl(i6).
HH. 391 U.S. 4:l0 (1961-1).
1-\9. Conuergence of Blac/1 and White Attitudes, supra note 61. at 6Hi.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Green v. County Sch. Bd., :191 U.S. 430,441-42 (1968).
9:1. Id. at 441.
94. Chri,;tine Rossell & David Armor. The Effectiucness of School Desegregation
Plans: 1968-1991, :lAM. POL. RES. 267,271 (199G).
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them reach "unitary status" in order to be considered
desegregated. This concept was first introduced by Green "as a
standard that segregated school systems could strive to
attain." 95 In Green the Supreme Court ruled that such school
boards were "clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take
whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary
system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root
and branch . ... "96 Moreover, the Court added that any
desegregation plans had to promise "immediate progress
toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation," 97 toward
the end that systems did not have "a 'white' school and a
'Negro' school, but just schools."98
In this holding we see the implicit assumption that had
there never been "state imposed" segregation, then schools
would have been naturally integrated along racial lines. This is
an assumption that both subsequent and previous history (as
was the case in segregated northern schools from before Brown
up till the present time) simply has not and did not justify. 99
From a public policy perspective, the Supreme Court was
embarking upon the creation and implementation of a specific
policy. An important measure of the success of this policy was
the degree to which black and white children occupied the
same classrooms, and not, in our estimation, of whether the
policy was efficient, politically feasible, or even equitable 100 (let
alone constitutional). By their own measures of effectiveness,
however, the coercive plans that followed in the wake of the
Green decision were decidedly none of the above. 101
Since most Southern school systems had either "white
schools or black schools," enforcing the Court's order to
immediately undo so systemic and ingrained a reality would be
the educational equivalent, in our opinion, of the unsettling
95.

Gary Orfield, Turnin{!, Bach to Se{!,regation, in RACE AND ETHNICITY IN TI-m
STATES: ISSUES AND DEBATES 1:l5, 149 (Stephen Steinberg ed., 2000).
Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38 (emphasis added).
Id. at 4:l9 (emphasis added).
Id. at 442.
99. See generally FORCED TO FAIL, supra note 1:1 (addressing the theme that the
roots of racial segregation are cultural and socioeconomic as well as state-imposed).
100. See Christine J. Rossell, Usinf{ Multiple Criteria to Evaluate Public Policies:
The Case of School Desegregation, 21 AM. POL. RES. 155 (1993) for an excellent
discussion of how these three evaluation criteria can be used to judge the value of
desegregation programs.
101. ld.
UNITED
96.
97.
98.
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social revolution then sweeping the country. 102 The Green
decision listed six facets of school operations where the Kent
County School District was racially segregated, and thus still a
dual system. 103 The decision stated that
[r]acial identification of the system's schools was complete,
extending not just to the composition of student bodies at the
two schools but to every facet of school operations - faculty,
staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities.
In short, the State, acting through the local school board and
school officials, organized and operated a dual system, part
'white' and part 'Negro.•104

These six facets have become known as the "Green Factors,"
and in order to be declared "unitary," school boards charged
with operating dual systems have since had to demonstrate
that they have desegregated each of these distinct areas of
school operations. 105 The Court decision specifically mentioned
re-zoning as a legitimate desegregation tool, 106 seeming to
move away from the Brown I decision, a ruling which can be
interpreted as supporting the concept of neighborhood district
schools. 107 With the Green decision, the Supreme Court seems
to have gone significantly beyond the letter and spirit of the
law elucidated in Brown. De jure segregated school districts
like New Kent County, Virginia and hundreds of others that
would follow, were ordered to immediately create desegregated
schools at what would ultimately seem to be any cost. 108 Green
marks the beginning of the period of most active and at times
intrusive involvement by the judiciary in the day-to-day
--------·-·------------------

102. Much has been written about the disruption caused by coercive desegregation
orders. See, e.g., CARLL. BANKSTON Ill & STEPHEN J. CALDAS, A THOU BLED DREAM: THI<:
PROMISE AND FAILURE OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN LOUISIANA (2002) [hereinafter A
TROUBLED DREAM]; FORCED TO FAIL, supra note 13. The lead author experienced these
disruptions first hand as a student in three different systems in three different states
that were in the very early phases of racially desegregating, including one school where
he was part of a small vanguard of white students bused to a formerly all black schooL
There were race riots and the very real threat of race riots in two of the three
desegregating schools he attended.
103. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
104. ld.
105. KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, PUBLIC SCHOOL L\W 913 (2005).
106. Green, 391 U.S. at 441.
107. Convergence of Black and White Attitudes, supra note 61, at 614-15.
108. See Paul Ciotti, Money and School Performance: Lessons from the Kansas City
Desegregation Experiment, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS No. 298 11 (Cato Institute, 1998)
[hereinafter Money and School Performance], for a study on just how much money a
school district could spend in a largely fruitless effort to racially desegregate schools.
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operations of local school districts.109

VI.

THE PERIOD OF SETTING LIMITS TO

AFFIRMATIVE DESEGREGATION

The Green decision paved the way to the decade of greatest
extension in judicial power over local school districts ordered to
desegregate during the 1970s. However, there were also
several seminal cases during this era that defined the limits of
court action. The Swann decision, while legalizing several
affirmative desegregation remedies, including busing, also
stated that school districts could not be held responsible for
racial imbalances caused by demographic factors beyond a
school board's control, and "[n]either school authorities nor
district courts are constitutionally required to make year-byyear adjustments of the racial composition of school bodies once
the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and
racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from
the system." 110 In other words, once a system was declared
unitary, it did not need to constantly re-adjust the racial
balance of schools according to previously set court ratios.
Among the most pivotal decisions of the 1970s that set
judicial restraints was Milliken I, which banned cross-district
desegregation remedies.l 11 The significance of the 197 4
Milliken Court decision cannot be overstated. The Court of
Appeals had ruled with the plaintiffs that in order to
meaningfully desegregate the majority black Detroit City
School District, cross district busing with the fifty-three
majority white suburban districts would be necessary. 112 Had
such an action been ruled constitutional and enforced, it is
conceivable that the Detroit metropolitan area would look quite
different today. 11 :l With forty years of experience and hindsight

See, e.g.. Missouri v .•Jenkins, 4!1f> U.S. :i:i, ::n (1!1DO); Davis v. East Baton
P:u·ish Sch. Bel., 721 F.2d 1425. 1441 (f>th Cir. l9H:l); Trahan v. Lafa~·ette Parish
Sch. Bd .. 244 F. Supp. :Jtl:l. 5tl8 (W.D. La. 1~Hi5).
10!1.

l~ougr

110.

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenbmg Bel. of Educ. 402 U.S. 1, 4 (1971).

111. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717. 745 (1974).

Id. at 718.
See generally !<'OI{CED TO FAIL, supra note J:l (asserting that where
governmental agencies trv to orchestrate racial balance> in schools through coercion,
white flight from the suburbs have dc>mographically transfmmed the metropolitan
!aJHbcapt•).
112.

1J:l.
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to inform us, it is highly likely that as lower socioeconomic
students filled Detroit's suburban schools, many affluent blacks
and whites would have either put their children in nonpublic
schools, or fled the Detroit metropolitan area altogether. 114
More significantly, however, had Milliken I been decided in
favor of the plaintiffs, a precedent would have been established
allowing cross-district busing in many metropolitan areas
whose core-cities were found to operate a de jure segregated
school system. Thus, not only would the schools and
communities of Detroit's metro area have been transformed,
but it is possible that the schools and communities surrounding
Denver, Boston, Los Angeles, New Orleans, Baton Rouge,
Dallas, Houston, the District of Columbia, and many other
metropolitan areas would have been radically changed as
well. 115 Had this been the judicial decision, it is possible that
not only would public schools in Baton Rouge be predominantly
poor and African-American today, but so would the schools in
its two white majority bedroom communities. 116 These two
suburban districts received much of the white flight streaming
from Baton Rouge as a consequence of a coercive and disruptive
desegregation order, because the fleeing parents preferred the
middle class schools beyond the reach of the federal
mandate. 117 The Supreme Court's overriding principle
established in Milliken I was that "the scope of the
[desegregation] remedy is determined by the nature and extent
of the constitutional violation." 118 In other words, the
punishment had to fit the crime.
The principle in Swann, which stated that there were limits
to judicial reach in dismantling dual school systems, was
applied and elaborated upon in the case of Pasadena City
Board of Education v. Spangler. 119 The Pasadena California
school board, which had been found to have unconstitutionally
segregated schools, submitted a plan in 1970 that racially

114. Emlution of School Desegregation, supra note 8:1, at 60-62.
115. Sec generally F<mO;Jl TO FAIL, supra note 1:3.
116. !d.
117. Stephen .J. Caldas & Carl L Bankston Ill, East Baton Rouge, School
Desegregation, and White Fli~-tht, 8 RES. IN THE SCHS. 21 (2001) [hereinafter East Baton
Rouge, School Descgref.{ation j.
118. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken[), 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974).
119. 427 U.S. 424 (197fi).
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balanced all schools in the district. 12 Four years later,
however, the original phintiffs in the case brought suit against
the board because the minority population in several schools
once again exceeded fifty percent. 121 In reviewing the court of
appeals decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
board, which it decreed had no control over the subsequent
resegregation of Pasadena's schools. 122 It cited from the earlier
Swann principle: "Neither school authorities nor district courts
are constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments
of the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative
duty to desegregate has been accomplished .... "123
Importantly, the Court recognized that once a system had
in good will imposed a desegregation plan that was approved
by all parties in a case, 124 the district could not be held
accountable for subsequently shifting racial compositions of
schools resulting from changing residential demographics. 125
Had the Court ruled differently, the desegregation histories of
many districts could have evolved radically different than was
the case. The disruptive and incoherent desegregation
experience of East Baton Rouge Parish (EBR), a district that
did indeed spend years fruitlessly chasing ever-elusive target
racial ratios, 12 6 may have been a far more typical case.

VII. MOVING FORWARD ON JUDICIALLY IMPOSED
DESEGREGATION

A. More Aggressive Approaches to Desegregation

The Supreme Court case of Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, 127 handed down in 1971, had
elements that were remarkably practical, like for instance the

120. Id. at 425.
121. Id. at 431.
122. Id. at 435.
123. Id. at 436 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
31-32 (1971)).
124. The court ruled that the Oklahoma City School Board had likewise acted in
good faith in implementing a court-ordered desegregation plan and was ruled to be
unitary in Board of Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249 (1991).
125. Spangler, 427 U.S. at 436-37.
126. East Baton Rouge, School Desegregation, supra note 117, at 21-32.
127. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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acknowledgement that districts should not be required to
constantly adjust school racial ratios as a consequence of
changing demographics beyond their control. Other elements of
the ruling, though, would ultimately prove to be unrealistic and
even destructive. Swann was the Supreme Court's first explicit
endorsement of busing as a legal remedy to end racial
desegregation in formerly de jure segregated school districts. 12 8
Additionally, the justices in the Swann ruling upheld the
constitutionality of "pairing" and "grouping" of noncontiguous
school zones (gerrymandering), endorsed majority to minority
transfers with mandatory transportation, and allowed the use
of racial target ratios as desegregation tools. 12 9 In Swann, the
"moral momentum" of the civil rights movement reached a
pinnacle with regards to the Court's actual manipulation of
schools as instruments to redesign not only attendance zones,
but society itsel£. 130 The sheer speed and weight of the
movement carried individuals and groups along for a ride that
was not always easy to steer or resist.

B. Expanding the Definition of De Jure Segregation
The 1973 Supreme Court desegregation ruling in Keyes v.
School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado 131 was the first to
involve a non-Southern school district. The Supreme Court
significantly expanded judicial involvement and oversight in
local school district affairs through its holding in this case
when it found that the Denver school district-which had never
operated an explicitly de jure racially dual system-was in fact
a dual system due to racially segregative practices that affected
a substantial portion of the city's student body. 13 2 After Keyes
it became easier to find that non-Southern school districts were
guilty of operating dual de jure systems, though there may
have been no formal history of school segregation, and though
racially segregative practices did not affect all of a district's
students. In short, with Keyes the Court extended the
128. ld. at 29-30.
129. Id. at 25.
130. Whereas Brown was revolutionary in ordering districts to allow students to
attend schools in their neighborhoods without regards to race, Swann was
revolutionary in actually forcing students to attend governmentally designated schools
(which were not necessarily neighborhood schools) based on their race.
131. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 191 (1973).
132. ld. at 201.
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definition of de jure segregation to include situations where
state imposed segregation was less obvious. 1:1:3 The Court ruled
that the Denver school board "by use of various techniques
such as the manipulation of student attendance zones, school
site selection and a neighborhood school policy, created or
maintained racially or ethnically (or both racially and
ethnically) segregated schools .... "134
The Keyes case thus expanded the definition of de jure
segregation to include school systems across the entire United
States, provided it could be proven that "school authorities
have carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting
a substantial portion of the students, schools, teachers, and
facilities with the school system .... " 135 On the one hand, the
Courts were finally acknowledging the reality that racial
discrimination in educational opportunities for blacks and
Hispanics, however subtle the discrimination, was not just
limited to the South. On the other hand, the vast judicial
efforts to redesign school districts that had focused on the
South would now take on a more national scope. School
districts charged with racial discrimination were almost always
found guilty of de jure segregation if any actions the district
took tended to increase racial segregation, like building a black
school in the center of a black community. 136 According to at
least one well-known desegregation scholar, simply the
existence of racially identifiable schools was in itself sufficient
evidence of a discriminatory and culpable system, even if onerace schools were simply the result of a "neighborhood school
policy." 137 In order to be declared unitary on the Green factor of
"student assignment," Northern and Western school systems
ordered to desegregate were, like their Southern counterparts,
mandated to achieve, and in some cases maintain, certain
specific racially balanced ratios. 138 This would prove an almost
impossibly elusive feat, just as similar racial juggling acts had

Id. at 210-12.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 201.
Evolution of School Desegregation, supra note 83, at fi4.
137. Convergence of Black and White Attitudes, supra note 61, at 614-15 (stating
1:33.
134.
135.
136.

that neighborhood schools were "race neutral because studPnts were assigned to
schools on the basis of their residence, not their race").
138. Evolution of School Desegregation, supra note 83, at 54.
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failed throughout much of the South. 139

C. White Backlash Against the New Approaches
Shortly after Keyes the Boston school district was found
guilty of de jure segregation in 1974, and was ordered to
implement a mandatory student reassignment plan. 140 The
reassignment plan was probably the most extensive plan based
on race in U.S. history. 141 Following rioting and bus
burnings, 142 whites began fleeing the system by the thousands,
never to return. 143 The percent of white students in the
average minority child's classroom in Boston decreased every
single year from the beginning of forced busing in 1974, where
it was 57% white, to the turn of the twenty-first century when
it went to 15%.1 44 The Boston school system was at last
declared unitary in 1989.1 45 Following the end of race-based
school assignments in 2000 (a practice abandoned due to a
parent-initiated lawsuit), 146 the Boston school system was sued
again in 2002. It was sued for still considering the race of
students in school admissions-only now it was accused of
discrimination against white and not black students. 147

D. Problems with Governmental Remedies to Social Inequality
The imposition of change by governmental agencies, while
it resulted in sometimes necessary change, overlooked the fact
that schools are not just expressions of political goals, but
social environments embedded in' American social networks
and structures. 148 Policies like forced busing cannot succeed if

139. See FORCED TO FAIL, supra note 13, at 155-79 (documenting the failure of
desegregation orders to maintain racial balance in a sample of several well-known nonsouthern districts including Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, and New York).
140. Evolution of School Desegregation, supra note 83, at 59-62.
141. Id. at 60.
142. See generally ,JACK TAnlm, BOSTON RIOTS: THREE CENTURIES OF SOCIAL
VIOLENCE (2001).
143. Evolution of School Desegregation, supra note 83, at 60-62 (documenting
white flight as a direct result of Boston's desegregation plan).
144. Id. at 62.
145. Id.
146. McLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Comm., 938 F. Supp. 1001, 1003 (D. Mass. 1996).
147. Boston's Children First v. Boston Sch. Comm., 183 F. Supp. 2d 382. 382 (D.
Mass. 2002).
148. FORCED TO Fi\IL, supra note 13, at 73.
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they are inconsistent with social trends or the interests of
social groups and communities, at least not in democratic
societies where individuals have the means to choose
alternative courses of action other than the undesirable
government plan. 149 Certain central beliefs stemming from the
idealism of the Civil Rights Era, like the idea that all schools
should be racially balanced, became institutionalized in
governmental policy and judicial rulings like Green, Swann,
and Keyes. As in the case of researcher David Armor discussed
below, this reality made it increasingly difficult to voice
opposition to unproductive policies without seeming racist,
narrow-minded, or cold-hearted. 150 However, it did not stymie
the silent opposition of white and middle-class flight from
school districts under coercive desegregation orders.l 51 James
Coleman, the very researcher whose influential study had been
used to justify coercive desegregation techniques like busing,
reluctantly arrived at this sober conclusion in the mid1970s.152
The case of Professor David Armor in 1971-72 provides a
sense of how the popular assumptions of the civil rights
paradigm, like the efficacy of busing, influenced the political
climate in academia. 153 Armor, who was an associate professor
at Harvard University in the early 1970s, was told by the
Harvard Education Review that his Boston desegregation
study could not be published because the journal had just
published a previous controversial article on race, and did not
want to follow it up with yet another controversial pieceregardless of its merit. 154 Armor's study found that a sample of
black students in Boston were not benefiting from the huge

149. Id. at 109 (discussing in detail the political economy of American schooling
and the strategies families use to choose their children's schools).
150. See generally SHELBY STEELE, WHITE GUILT 105 (2006) (discussing the
psychological pressures prohibiting whites, in particular, from voicing opposition to any
programs initiated during the Civil Rights movement).
151. See FORCED TO FAIL, supra note 13, at 135 (studying the implementation of
desegregation court orders in fifteen separate school districts, and documenting
significant white flight as a consequence of these court·ordered plans in the large
majority of these cases).
152. James S. Coleman, Trends in School Integration, 4 EDUC. RES., 3, 9 (1975).
153. David Armor, Reflections of an Expert Witness, in THE END OF
DESEGREGATION? 3, 4-5 (Stephen J. Caldas & Carl L. Bankston III eds., 2003)
[hereinafter Reflections].
154. Id. at 4.
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busing experiment. 155 He was told not that his study was
flawed, but that his findings were too controversial. 15 6
However, Armor had a chance meeting on an airplane with
then Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 157 who knew from
first-hand experience how a study with unpopular findings
involving race could generate heated controversy. 158 Moynihan
listened to Armor's story and then encouraged him to submit
his article to the more widely circulated Public Interest, which
agreed to publish Armor's findings. 159 Armor's evidence that
busing was not working briefly created a national buzz and
prompted an academic adversary at Harvard to go as far as
stealing his data. 160 Even the respected sociologist James S.
Coleman came under fire for publishing his empirical 1975
article, which questioned the wisdom of busing students if the
end result was white abandonment of public schools. 161
According to Nobel Prize winning economist Gary S. Becker,
"Some prominent members of the American Sociological
Association moved to have Coleman expelled for daring to
reach this conclusion."162
One of the most counter-productive desegregation orders
ever handed down by a federal district court was foisted upon
the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board (EBR) in Davis v.
East Baton Rouge Parish School Board in the early 1980s.l 63
When it settled in 2003, Davis was the longest running
desegregation lawsuit in U. S. history. 164 Davis represents
perhaps the greatest extent of judicial reach in the half century
of U.S. district court rulings because the EBR system was

155. Jd.
156. Jd.
157. Jd. at 4~5.
158. DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE NEnRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION
17, 29 (U.S. Department of Labor 1965) (concluding in a controversial report that the
black family was disintegrating, and that this demographic factor was one of the root
causes of "the tangle of pathologies" affecting black Americans).
159. Reflections, supra note 153, at 4; David Armor, The Evidence on Busing, 28
THE PULl. INT. 90 (1972).
160. Reflections, supra note 153, at 3~2:3. See Editorial, Dangerous Orthodoxy, N.Y.
TIMES, July 5, 1972.
161. See Coleman, supra note 152.
162. Obituary, James Coleman, Sociology, 14 THE U. OF CHI. CHRON., Mar. 30,
1995.
163. Davis v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 721 F.2d 1425, 1441 (1983).
164. Jd.
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micro-managed by a federal court judge over a period of
approximately twenty years. The system was ordered almost
yearly to continuously re-adjust school zones, bus schedules,
and target racial ratios in a completely fruitless attempt to
meaningfully desegregate the schools. 165 This Louisiana
episode is a reminder of just how disruptive and ultimately
destructive judicial micro-management of a system could be.
Even as whites fled with each judicially ordered desegregation
remedy, the EBR school system was constantly ordered to
adjust school zones throughout a quarter century in a futile
effort to achieve certain court-mandated racial ratios. 166 The
EBR system went from 69% white the year prior to forced
busing and school rezoning, to only 20.5% white twenty-four
years later when the system was finally declared, somewhat
ironically, to be racially "unitary." 167
The Baton Rouge desegregation experience seems a prime
example of what can happen when the interests of the
community are ignored for un-realistic and unattainable ideals.
Indeed, two largely middle-class adjoining suburban school
districts of Baton Rouge owe their astounding growth and
prosperity in part to white flight caused by the desegregation
debacle in EBR. 16 8 As for the quality of the school system left
behind in the wake of Baton Rouge's fleeing middle-class,
desegregation expert Christine Rossell observed, "I do not
believe that I have ever been in a school system where the
schools were in such poor condition as a result of taxpayer nonsupport."169

VIII. THE RISE OF SOCIOECONOMIC REDISTRIBUTION
THROUGH SCHOOLS

The federal

government not only deemed efforts

to

165. East Baton Rouge, School Desegregation, supra note 117, at 24-25.
166. Id. at 26.
167. Id. at 2:1 (outlining the desegregation experience of East Baton Rouge). The
most recent student enrollment data by race was obtained from the ANNUAL FINANCIAL
AND STATISTICAL REPORT produced by the Louisiana Department of Education and
available on-line at http://www.doe.state.la.us/lde/uploads/7558.pdf.
16H. East Baton Rouge, School Desegregation, supra note 117, at 26 (analyzing the
direct influence of EBR's desegregation order on the phenomenal growth of the
Ascension and Livingston Parishes); see generally A TROUBLED DREAM, supra note 102.
169. CHRISTINJ•: H. ROSSELL, [MPROVIN<: THE VOLUNTARY DESE<:JtEGATION PLAN IN
THE BATON Roue a: SCHOOL SYSTJ•:M 6 (Oct. 27, 1999).
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redistribute the social capital of middle class America through
the assignment of its children to schools populated by
disadvantaged minority children as constitutional, but it also
weighed in on the redistribution of educational funding. The
Supreme Court in its 1973 ruling in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez first addressed the issue of
inequitable district funding as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection clause. 170 In Rodriguez, the
plaintiffs argued that poorer districts, which were heavily
populated by minorities, could not fund schools to the same
level as richer districts, which could raise more money through
property taxes. 171 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Texas,
stating that "the Texas system does not operate to the peculiar
disadvantage of any suspect class." 172 The Court added that
inequitable education funding was not a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment since, "[e]ducation, of course, is not
among the rights afforded explicit protection under our federal
constitution." 173 Thus, this school finance issue appeared
settled, and at the time similar cases against other states were
dropped. 174 However, in Rodriguez the Court did not close the
door on challenges that inequitable school district funding
might violate state constitutions that did explicitly guarantee
the rights of citizens to an equal education. 175
Following Rodriguez, several state supreme court cases
found that unequal funding of local school districts, as a
consequence of the unequal distribution of wealth, was a
violation of state law. Among the more celebrated cases were
the California case of Serrano v. Priest, 176 and the Texas case
of Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby. 177 Moreover,

170. San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 2 (1973).
171. Id. at 5.
172. Id. at 28.
173. Id. at 35. The Constitution makes no reference to education. Thus, the Tenth
Amendment has typically been interpreted by courts and policy makers as giving to
states the primary responsibility of deciding how to deliver educational services to
their citizens. See The Evolution of Federal Involvement in Local Schools, supra note
77, at 49-53.
174. E.g., Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (1973); Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d
457 (Mich. 1972), vacated, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973).
175. KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 807 (2004).
176. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 619 (1971).
177. Edgewood lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 399 (Tex.1989).
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in Papason v. Allain, 178 the Supreme Court seemed to
backtrack a bit on its earlier Rodriguez decision. The Court
ruled that the plaintiffs' charge against the state of Mississippi
for inequitably distributing state funds from sixteenth section
lands 179 to local districts was indeed a Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection issue. 180 The distinctions made by the
Supreme Court justices in these two funding cases seem
minute, and are perhaps even a question of legal hair-splitting.
In actuality, the Court's position in Papason could be construed
as a shift in favor of plaintiffs' charges that unequal district
wealth needed to be more fairly distributed to provide more
equitable educational outcomes. 181 Since Rodriguez, many
state education funding programs have been challenged as
inequitable under either federal or state law. 182 The most
recent funding-related case in Connecticut, discussed infra,
linked the state constitutional provisiOn for equitable
educational opportunities to both funding and the
socioeconomic integration of certain student groups. 183 The
courts have been fairly evenly split against plaintiff school
districts and state defendants, with a trend toward more
judicial scrutiny of state legislative disbursement of
educational monies.184
The Supreme Court desegregation case of Freeman v. Pitts
specifically addressed equitable funding when it established a
"seventh" factor to Green's six factors for determining unitary
status. 185 This seventh factor was termed "quality of
education," 186 which included "certain educational resources"
such as teacher qualifications and experience, library books,
student outcomes as measured on standardized tests, and "per
pupil expenditures."187

178. Papason v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285-86 (1986).
179. The Land Ordinance of 1785, passed by the Continental Congress, set aside
the sixteenth section of each surveyed township for school purposes. See United States
v. Wyoming, 331 U.S. 440, 443 (1947).
180. Papason, 478 U.S. at 282.
181. ALEXANDER, supra note 105, at 800-01.
182. Id. at 806-09.
183. Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1337 (1996).
184. See ALEXANDER, supra note 105, at 806-08.
185. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 482 (1992).
186. ld.
187. Id. at 482-84.
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The Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) is an
extreme case that highlights the occasional absurdities
associated with futile attempts to reduce the black-white
achievement gap in efforts to seek unitary status. In Missouri
u. Jenkins, the district court judge's directive to the KCMSD to
spend two billion dollars over a twelve-year period was upheld
by the United States Supreme Court. 188 Since the local district
was virtually bankrupt due to white flight and the failure of
voters to pass school tax increases, a federal judge held the
state partially liable for both the segregated school system and
the cost to fix it. 189 The federal judge also ordered the local
property taxes doubled, and an income tax surcharge on all
those working in Kansas City but living elsewhere. 190 The
Supreme Court ruled that such draconian measures were
constitutional and necessary to overcome state sponsored
segregation. 191 According to a very thorough Cato Institute
policy analysis of the KSMSD desegregation spending program,
Kansas City spent as much as $11,700 per pupil-more
money per pupil, on a cost of living adjusted basis, than any
other of the 280 largest districts in the country. The money
bought higher teachers' salaries, 15 new schools, and such
amenities as an Olympic-sized swimming pool with an
underwater viewing room, television and animation studios, a
robotics lab, a 25-acre wildlife sanctuary, a zoo, a model United
Nations with simultaneous translation capability, and field
trips to Mexico and Senegal. The student-teacher ratio was 12
or 13 to 1, the lowest of any major school district in the
country. 192
According to the gist of the Cato study, in the ensuing
twelve years in the KSMSD, white flight continued, black
achievement was no better, and the black-white achievement
gap had not been reduced. 193 Even the original federal court
judge on the case had to admit that the massive spending had
made little difference in school achievement, and that the
district had done everything in its power to undo vestiges of

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 55 (1990).
Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 408 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
Id. at 413.
Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 54 (1990).
Money and School Performance, supra note 108, at 1.
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past de jure segregation. 194 In Jenkins II, the Supreme Court
ultimately restricted the federal court's far-reaching powers in
the case, ruling unconstitutional the use of state funds to raise
KSMSD teacher salaries to higher levels than the surrounding
districts. 195 Jenkins II also ruled that the district did not have
to raise minority achievement scores to the national average to
meet the "quality of education" desegregation target, but only
undo that part of the black-white achievement gap caused by
previous de jure segregation. 196 In 2003, the new judge on the
case declared the school system was unitary when he ruled
that the black-white achievement gap had been sufficiently
reduced, undoing all vestiges of the past de jure injury. 197
As we see in the KSMSD, economic redistribution in school
desegregation efforts often did not deliver the promised
equality of educational outcomes. Indeed, it is difficult to find
any specific instances where school desegregation worked
according to plan. 198 More generally, Erik Hanushek's
thorough research on educational inputs and outputs finds only
a weak correlation between educational spending on the one
hand, and higher student achievement on the other. 199 His
meta-analyses suggest the limits of resource reallocation efforts
to reduce what still remains a sizable minority-white
achievement gap into the twenty-first century. 200 Thus, we see
that the high hopes some idealistic policy makers had of
erasing educational inequality through both the redistribution
of students via aggressive desegregation plans, and the efforts
to redistribute school funding, fell far short of expectations. 201

194. Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 40:3 (W.D. Mo. 19H7).
195. Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins II), 515 U.S. 70, 71 (1995).
196. Id. at 101.
197. Tracy Allen, Judge Grants School District Unitary Status, THE CALL, Aug. 15,
2003, http://www.kccall.com/news/2003/0815/Front_Page/027.html (last visited Oct. 9,
2003).
198. Sec generally FORC:ED TO FAIL, supra note 13. We investigated many of the
most celebrated desegregation cases, discussed case by case in chapter 7, and did not
identify even one that achieved the goals of racial balance and educational equity for
all students, regardless of race.
199. See Eric A. Hanushek, Assessing the Effects of School Resources on Student
Performance: An Update, 19 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 141-64 (Summer
1997); Eric A. Hanushek, The Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in
Public Schools, 24 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 1141-77 (Sep. 1986).
200. Hanushek, Assessing the Effects, at 141.
201. See FORCED TO FAIL, supra note 13, at 114-17.
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IX. THE WEAKENING OF UNITARY STATUS AND
THE END OF OVERSIGHT

From early in the American school desegregation drama,
some school districts' desegregation plans, like those for
districts such as Iberia Parish, Louisiana in 1970, were deemed
adequate under a unitary status analysis to undo previous
vestiges of de jure segregation, and were released from federal
judicial oversight. 202 At the other extreme were systems like
Lafayette Parish, Louisiana, which was just granted unitary
status in April 2006 after forty-one years of court
supervision. 203 The Supreme Court itself recognized the
importance of local control over schools, stating in Board of
Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell that "[l]ocal control over
the education of children allows citizens to participate in
decisionmaking, and allows innovation so that school programs
can fit local needs." 204 In the same ruling, the Court stressed
that desegregation orders were meant to be temporary, and not
extended indefinitely to address changing community racial
characteristics. 205
The process by which a formerly "dual system" school board
could be declared "unitary" had to be worked out in the courts
on a case-by-case basis. The parameters set forth in the 1968
Green decision 206 were among the first specific guidelines for
determining whether or not a system could be declared
unitary. 207 An issue that arose early on was the length of time
that the federal district courts could exercise oversight after a
school system came into compliance with the court-ordered
plan. 208 In 1961, Oklahoma City was charged with operating a
dual segregated school system, and eleven years later, in 1972,
it was found to still have vestiges of its dual system in place. 20 9

202. Henderson v. Iberia Parish Sch. Bd., 245 F. Supp. 419, 422 (1965).
20:1. Sebreana Domingue, Desq;ref[ation Case Closure Brings a New Day, DAILY
ADVERTISEH, Apr. 25. 2006, at A 1: see Stephen J. Caldas & Carl L. Bankston. An
Evaluation of the Consequences of Sehoul Dese![regatiun in Lafayette, Louisiana, 10
RES. IN TH I•; SCHS. 41, 41-52 (200::!) (studying the effects of the long running Lafayette,
Louisiana desegregation suit).
204. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991).
205. ld. at 241.
206. Green v. County Scb. Bd., :191 U.S. 4:10, 441-42 (1968).
207. ld. at 4:l5.
208. Dowell v. Sch. Bd. of Okla. City Pub. Sch., 219 F. Supp. 427,447 (196:1).
209. Dowell v. Bd. of Educ. of the Okla. City Pub. Sch., 465 F.2d 1012. 1016 (1972).
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The court ordered the board to adopt a more stringent
desegregation remedy, which the board faithfully implemented
to the satisfaction of the court. 2 10
Five years later, in 1977, the district court released the
Oklahoma City school system from court oversight, ruling that
substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements
had been achieved. 211 However, five years later another suit
was filed against the board to reopen the case, due to a new
student assignment policy that the board adopted. 212 The case
eventually wound its way to the Supreme Court in Board of
Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, which ruled that since
Oklahoma City had been decreed unitary, the case could not be
reopened unless the school system was found, once again, to be
in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 21 3 The Court declared that "[f]rom the very first,
federal supervision of local school systems was intended as a
temporary measure to remedy past discrimination"2 14 and
"such decrees ... are not intended to operate in perpetuity."2 15
Another important principle elucidated by the Supreme Court
in the Oklahoma City case was that districts only had to
eliminate vestiges of past de jure discrimination "to the extent
practicable." 21 6 This would seem to rule out some of the more
outlandish plans, such as the Kansas City plan, which cost $2
billion, but failed to reach its target goal of raising black
achievement to the national norm. 21 7
Another major issue resolved in the 1990s was whether or
not a system could be released piecemeal from court
supervision. In other words, could a system be freed from court
oversight on one or more Green factors, while the courts
continued supervision on those factors not yet adequately
addressed? In the case of Freeman v. Pitts, the DeKalb county
school system had achieved its racial balancing goal in the first
year of implementation, but due to subsequent, dramatic
-------·--· - - - - - - -

210.
(1985).
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Dowell v. Bd. of Educ. of the Okla. City Pub. Sch., 606 F. Supp. 1548, 1551

Id.
Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 241 (1991).
Id. at 246.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 250.
Money and School Performance, supra note 108, at 13.
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demographic shifts in the county, could not meet its stated
objective in each of the following sixteen years. 218 Still, the
district court declared that the DeKalb county system was
unitary in student assignment, since the system had undone
the previous de jure injury. 21 9 The court also declared the
system unitary on every other Green factor except teacher
assignment and resource allocation. 220 The case was appealed
by both parties, and eventually landed on the Supreme Court's
docket, which ruled that desegregating systems could be
released piecemeal from judicial oversight. 2 21 The Supreme
Court went on to affirm that systems could not be held
accountable for shifts in residential housing patterns beyond
their control, and that "[r]acial balance is not to be achieved for
its own sake," 222 seeming to backtrack on the redistribution
approach of earlier, more coercive desegregation orders. 22 3
In 1999, a federal district court judge ruled that the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg System (CMS) was at last unitary on
student assignment, and could no longer use race-based
student assignment to schools or school programs. 224
Ironically, the system was declared unitary after the parents of
a white child filed a lawsuit claiming that the district was
discriminating against their child based on race. 225 The six
year old was refused admittance to a gifted program because
"slots reserved for one race will not be filled by students of
another race." 226 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
eventually upheld the lower court ruling. 227 The court of
appeals ruling was itself appealed to the Supreme Court, which
refused to hear the case. 22 8 On closer examination, though, the
CMS system was not as desegregated as it appeared on paper,
as it had practiced extensive student tracking, thus recreating

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 4 78 (1992).
Id. at 492.
ld. at 482.
ld. at 492.
Id. at 494.
Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968).
Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch., 57 F. Supp. 2d 228, 232 (1999).
ld. at 284.
ld. at 287 (emphasis in original).
Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 269 F.3d 305,312 (4th Cir. 2001).
Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 535 U.S. 986 (2002).
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segregation within its school system. 229 Moreover, as soon as
the CMS schools were declared unitary, the system began to
resegregate almost immediately, 2:1° suggesting that without
coercive court oversight many parents were not interested in
the court's vision, and had only been reluctantly complying
with it. Additionally, there remains an enormous black-white
achievement gap among CMS students, 231 though one of the
explicit justifications for attempting to desegregate the system
in the first place was to close this gap.232
X. DESEGREGATION ENTERS A CONTENTIOUS FUTURE

A. Connecticut and Missouri
After more than half a century of judicially mandated
school desegregation efforts, the early lofty vision of the
Supreme Court to not have "a 'white' school or a 'black' school,
but just schools" 233 has still not been fully realized, and indeed,
based on resegregation patterns, may be more elusive than
ever. 234 What does the future of desegregation litigation hold?
The Connecticut case of Sheff v. O'Neill, and its tentative
settlement in 2003 may provide a glimpse into the new age of
desegregation type litigation. 235 In this unique case, the
Connecticut Supreme Court potentially opened up a new era in
school desegregation by ruling that the Hartford public school
system violated students' rights by not providing an equal
educational opportunity to its largely poor black and Hispanic

229. Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, White Privilc!{e in a Desegregatin!{ School System:
The Charlotte·Mecklenburg Schools Thirty Years After Swann, in THE END cw
DESEGREGATION? 106, 106 (Stephen .J. Caldas & CarlL. Bankston III eds., 2003).
230. STEPHEN SAMUEL SMITH, BOOM FOR WHOM'? EDUCATION, DESEGREGATION
AND DEVELOPMENT IN CHAHLOTTE 60 (2004).
231. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBUJW SCHOOLS PERCENT OF STUDENTS AT ACHIEVEM~;NT
LEVELS FOR END-OF-COURSE TEST RESULTS (2007), http://www.cms.kl2.nc.us/
departments/instrAccountability/EOC06-07/2007EOCDistrictA!l.pdf (showing only
49.8%, of black students in the CMS scored at proficient levels, compared to 83.6% of
white students).
232. SMITH, supra note 230, at 203.
2:33. Green v. County Sch. Ed., :'l91 U.S. 430, 442 (1968).
2:34. Amelia E. Lester, Still Separate After All These Years?, HGSE NEWS, May 1,
2004. http://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/features/orfield05012004.html.
235. Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
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students, as prescribed in the state's constitution. 2 36 In Sheff,
the court ruled that the de facto racial, ethnic, and economic
segregation of Hartford's schools was unconstitutional, and
ordered cross-district desegregation remedies to rectify the
racial and ethnic segregation of the capital city's schools. 237
Sheff removed the desegregation issue from the federal
courts and made it a state issue -placing on the state of
Connecticut the onus of providing an equal educational
opportunity to all Connecticut students in accord with the state
constitution. 238 The plaintiffs brought the case against the
Hartford school district in 1989, and the Supreme Court of
Connecticut ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in 1996, ordering
Hartford's schools to desegregate. 239 In 2003 the plaintiffs in
the case won a partial victory, with the Connecticut Supreme
Court awarding a tentative settlement of $45 million to the
impoverished Hartford district over a four-year period to
decrease de facto racial and economic segregation. 240 However,
the state of Connecticut's Office of Fiscal Analysis estimated
that the cost of the desegregation remedies, which included
building two new magnet schools 241 per year for four years,
was likely to soar to $89 million dollars, 242 an amount that
proved to be an underestimate. 24 3
Since the case focused on both de facto and socioeconomic
segregation, Sheff could inspire similar lawsuits against other
states in which districts are segregated into rich and poor, but
have been exempt from desegregation litigation due to there
being no history of de jure segregation. Sheff could also

236. ld. at 1281-82.
2:37. ld. at 1290.
2:38. ld. at 1281-82.
2:39. ld.
240. CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, QUESTIONS ABOUT SHEFF V.
O'NEILL SETTLEMENT (Feb. 1:3, 2003), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/olrdata/ed/rpt/200:i-R0214.htm.
241. "'Magnet schools,' as generally understood, are public schools of voluntary
enrollment designed to promote integration by drawing students away from their
neighborhoods and private schools through distinctive curricula and high quality."
Missouri v. ,Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 40 n.6 (1990) (citing Janet R. Price & Jane R. Stern,
Ma{{net Schools as a Strate{{y for lnte{{ration and School Reform, 5 YALE L. & PoL'Y
REV. 291 (1987)).
242. CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, supra note 240.
243. Lawmahers Won't Vote on Sheff Settlement, BOSTON GLOBE, July 21, 2007,
available
at
http://www.boston.com/news/educationlk_12/articles/2007/07/21/
]a wmakers_ wont_vote_on_sheff_settlement.
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conceivably inspire lawsuits against systems that have
eliminated vestiges of de jure segregation, but are still
socioeconomically
segregated.
According
to
Richard
Kahlenberg, this could potentially re-open the legality of crossdistrict busing, 244 something ruled unconstitutional for racial
desegregation purposes in the 1974 Milliken I case.2 45 More
recently,
Kahlenberg has
argued
that
metropolitan
socioeconomic desegregation remedies could be entirely
defensible, and could free plaintiffs from previous federal court
rulings which severely limited desegregation strategies based
on race. 246
We agree with Kahlenberg that the Sheff case may indeed
have tremendous implications for re-instituting cross-district
busing and other "affirmative" type strategies for the purpose
of socioeconomically integrating school systems. However, in
states where poverty and race are closely correlated, there is
little material difference between socioeconomic and racial
segregation. 247 As such, it would seem that similar undesirable
consequences would follow from the affirmative type
desegregation remedies proffered by Kahlenberg. Sheff already
has some unsettling similarities with the $2 billion Kansas
City, Missouri case. 248 One similarity is the open-ended nature
of the settlement. After the prior settlement expired without
the school district reaching its desegregation goals, the
plaintiffs in the Sheff case tentatively settled for an additional
$112 million to be spent on magnet schools, charter schools,
and other programs over the next five years to help further
desegregate the city's schools. 249 Another similarity with the
Kansas City episode and Sheff is that the magnet schools being
built in Hartford to comply with the settlement are counting on
the surrounding suburban districts to supply middle class
students, thus increasing the percentage of minority students
244. RICHARD D. KAHLENBEHG, ALL 'l'OGETHEH Now: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS
SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 216~17 (2001).
245. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken[), 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974).
246. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Economic School Integration, in THE END OF
DESEGREGATION? 149 (Stephen J. Caldas & CarlL. Bankston Ill eds., 2003).
247. See generally A TROUBLED DREAM, supra note 102.
248. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 55 (1990).
249. Lawmakers Won't Vote on Sheff Settlement, supra note 243. The prior
desegregation goal was to have at least 30% of the students enrolled in racially
integrated schools by the settlement's expiration date, but as of 2007, only 9%, of the
students attended schools that qualified as racially integrated. Id.
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attending racially integrated schools from 10% to at least
30%. 2 50 In the event that the students in the surrounding
suburban districts do not participate in the "build it and they
will come" plan to the extent envisioned, the Hartford district,
like Kansas City, could be left with the full bill to run half
empty schools including transportation costs, which are
conservatively projected to run into the millions of dollars. 251

B. The Michigan Cases
The year 2003 saw other landmark cases that could
potentially impact the future of school desegregation in the
United States. In the University of Michigan cases Grutter u.
Bollinger252 (law school admissions) and Gratz u. Bollinger253
(undergraduate admissions), the Supreme Court handed down
its most momentous affirmative action decision since the Bakke
case 254 of 1978. In Gratz, the Supreme Court ruled that the
University of Michigan's undergraduate admission policy of
awarding points solely based on an applicant's race was
unconstitutional. 255 However, in Grutter the Supreme Court
held that the university's "compelling interest" in fostering
diversity met the "strict scrutiny" standard required by the
Fourteenth Amendment when governmental bodies make
distinctions based on racial categories. 256 Thus, the Court
upheld the university's law school policy of giving preferences
to minorities in its admissions procedures, as long as race was
but one factor among many considered in the admissions
process. 2 57 This legal allowance for public institutions to
racially discriminate between individuals has ensured that the
controversy swirling around state efforts to promote diversity
(whether in K-12 or university settings) would continue for
250. CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, SHEFF V. O'NEILL
SETTLEMENT (Jan. 27, 2003), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/olrdata/ed/rpt/2003-R0112.htm.
251. Id.
252. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343-44 (2003).
253. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 (2003).
254. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978) (this is a
landmark decision where the Supreme Court bars quota systems in college admissions
while affirming the constitutionality of affirmative action programs giving an
advantage to minorities).
255. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-71.
256. Grutter, 539 U.S. at :333.
257. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-71; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
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some time to come.2 58
While the Supreme Court's rulings in the Grutter and Gratz
cases do not directly implicate K-12 schools, they do have
potential implications for elementary and secondary education.
For example, in light of the Gratz ruling, Little Rock Arkansas
officials were considering dropping using race as the sole
criteria for admittance to some magnet schools. 259 On the other
hand, the Grutter ruling reiterates the high court's position
that if the state has an interest in diversifying the racial
composition of state institutions they can consider the race of
individuals in a government selection process. Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, in her dissension from the Court's ruling in
the undergraduate Gratz case, stated, "The stain of generations
of racial oppression is still visible in our society, and the
determination to hasten its removal remains vital." 260
Ginsburg thus reveals that there is thinking on the Supreme
Court that the vestiges of racial oppression which school
desegregation has been attempting to undo still linger. 261
Moreover, her statement implies that governmental action to
undo these vestiges is still necessary, and indeed, "vital." 262
Thus, we still see a judicial orientation at the highest levels of
American government that is favorable to upholding the use of
race as a factor in school admissions.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, speaking for a majority of
the court in Grutter, did indicate that she thought the end of
racial preferences in university admissions was in sight-but
were still necessary for the time being. 263 She wrote, "We
expect that in 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences
will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved
today." 264 It would be interesting to know upon what logic

258. The Plessy and Grutter Decisions, supra note 31, at 67. Technically, the
controversy could rage until at least 2028, the date at which Justice O'Connor's "sunset
clause" would end, and, according to the former Supreme Court justice, we will no
longer need affirmative action type policies. Id.
259. Caroline Hendrie, City Boards Weigh Rule on Diversity, EDUCATI0;\1 WEEK ON
THE
WEB,
November
5,
2003,
http://www.edweek.org/ew/ewstory.cfm?slug=
10Deseg.h23.
260. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 276.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. :~06, 343 (2003).
264. Id.
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O'Connor based this prediction. 26 5 Does she envision the
elimination of the minority-white achievement gap within a
quarter century, so that minorities will be able to compete on
the level playing field of university academic admissions
requirements? If so, her position would imply that she foresees
a significant improvement in k-12 minority education.
However, given the trend toward the continued re-segregation
of American public schooling, and the association of segregated
minority schooling with inferior academic outcomes 266especially for African American and Hispanic studentsO'Connor's vision seems overly optimistic. One outcome of the
Grutter decision seemed more certain: in the words of another
legal scholar it will likely "lead to confusion, to controversy,
and to litigation."267

C. The Seattle I Louisville Case
The litigation came soon, but with a conservative twist. By
the second half of the first decade of the twenty-first century,
the Court had moved from deciding whether schools would be
forced to redistribute their students to whether they would be
allowed to do so. At the end of 2006, the Supreme Court began
to hear the cases of Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board
of Education. 268 Seattle, Washington had not been under a
desegregation order, but its school board had decided
voluntarily to take race into consideration when setting limits
on how many children of each race could go to each school. 269
Jefferson County, which contains Louisville, Kentucky, had
been under a court order to desegregate from 1973 to 2000. 270

265. Upon close scrutiny, .Justice O'Connor's assertion seems more based in
wishful thinking than in sound empirical social science. See Carl L. Bankston III,
Grutter v. Bollinger, Weak Foundations? 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 66 (2006).
266. See Carl Bankston III & Stephen ,J. Caldas, Majority African American
Schools and Social Injustice: The Influence of De Facto Segregation on Academic
Achievement, 75 Soc. FORCES fi35, 535-55 (199G).
267. David Schimmel, Affirming Affirmative Action: Supreme Court Holds
Diversity to Be a Compelling Interest in University Admissions, 180 EDUC. L. REP. 401,
415 (2003).
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The latter district had been declared unitary but its school
board, which had fought desegregation in the 1970s, had
chosen to maintain its own plan to re-assign students in order
to maintain racial balance in the schools, even after it was no
longer required to do so. 271 Parents in both locations whose
children were unable to enroll in nearby or desired schools as a
result of race-conscious assignment sued, maintaining that this
was discriminatory. 272
On June 28, 2007, the Court decided the issue in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.
The Court ruled against school board procedures of raceconscious assignment, and Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter,
and Ginsberg dissented from the decision, convinced that the
school boards' strategies of race conscious assignment did
indeed serve a compelling state interest. 27 3 Justice Kennedy
concurred with the decision in this case, arguing that schools
may sometimes use race conscious approaches, but that the
districts did not sufficiently tailor their plans to achieve their
goals. 274 Justice Roberts seemed to dismiss the use of race in
assignment altogether, remarking that "the way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on
the basis of race."275
The split decision of the Court on the question of whether
racial redistribution of students would even be allowed, much
less compelled, indicated that American desegregation law had
moved from commitment to uncertainty. If there is any
certainty with regards to the future of school desegregation
litigation, it is that we can almost certainly expect it. Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion leaves the door open for more
officially sanctioned governmental discrimination based on
race, and the consequent claimed injury of individuals who will
protest the injustice of said discrimination. Kennedy
expounded, "In the administration of public schools by the state
and local authorities it is permissible to consider the racial
makeup of schools and to adopt general policies to encourage a
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diverse student body, one aspect of which is its racial
composition." 276

XI. UNCERTAIN FUTURE: PREDICTIONS
As judicial desegregation in the U.S. faces this uncertain
future, Americans debate its merits and alternatives. Some
current black American leaders question the notion that allblack institutions are somehow inferior, which they suggest is
implied by school desegregation efforts. 277 In fact, in Topeka,
Kansas, where the desegregation era was born, the former
black superintendent blamed the continuing poor academic
performance of black students on desegregation itself, stating
on the 50th anniversary of the Brown decision that "the closing
of black neighborhood schools-with their traditions,
yearbooks, mottoes, fight songs and halls of fame-ripped the
centerpiece out of those communities."2 78
With the desirability and possibility of racial desegregation
open to question from so many quarters, some have focused
their hopes on the redistribution of students by class, rather
than race. 279 Will the courts pursue the socioeconomic
desegregation of schools as a means of attempting more racial
desegregation? If so, this could entail a new round of extensive
judicial intervention in American schools aimed at
redistribution on socioeconomic rather than racial grounds. 280
If, as we argue here, racial redistribution has not worked to
meaningfully desegregate schools, there is no reason to believe
that the socioeconomic version would, even if race and
socioeconomic status were not so intertwined in American
society.
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With the retirement of Sandra Day O'Connor from the
Supreme Court, a voice for moderation who represented the socalled "swing vote" on controversial court rulings like the
Grutter decision, and her replacement with the more
conservative jurist Samuel Alita, the Supreme Court's
orientation to school desegregation has taken a more
conservative, strictly constructivist orientation. We see this
increased conservative influence in the 2007 Seattle/Meredith
decisions. However, if desegregation activists take their cause
to state courts, as they have in Connecticut, the composition of
the Supreme Court may make little or no difference in future
desegregation litigation. If this later scenario develops, we may
be in for many more tumultuous years of contentious,
expensive, divisive, and potentially counter-productive
desegregation litigation.
To summarize, in 1954 the United States embarked on a
long and sinuous legal road in its efforts to undo the "separate
but legal" legacy left in the wake of the Plessy v. Ferguson
decision of 1896. Whereas the majority of de jure school racial
segregation has been eliminated, in places like Louisiana,
almost two-thirds of the state's districts were still under court
supervisiOn to desegregate in 2007. 281 Moreover, de facto
segregation was the norm across much of the country, with
meaningful school integration stagnating, and school racial
resegregation taking place in many parts of the country. 2 82
Though plaintiffs in the future may shift legal strategies and
file suit against states for allowing de facto racial segregation
to persist, legal strategies, as we have seen in the Connecticut
Sheff case, have limits as to their effectiveness in creating
meaningfully integrated schools. Until the U.S. deals with the
underlying causes of school racial segregation, namely
socioeconomic
stratification,
which
according
to
the
government's latest figures has never been greater, 2 83 we are
likely to continue to see racially identifiable schools long into
the twenty-first century.
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